The more fundamental decision for the States ofthe international community, however, was whether to make the concessions necessary to create an effective international mechanism against the background of States insisting upon preserving the totality of their sovereign prerogatives, if such a view had held sway, no effective international criminal tribunal could have been created.
Introduction
In the eariy 1990s, while Western leaders Ian law, and even to adegree ofcynicism about were still congratulating themselves overthe end it. States and individuals had come to regard ofcommunlsmandthefalloftheSpvietempire. international criminal and humanitarian law the security structure that helped bring about as more of amoral code of conduct than bindthose events began to come apart. Less than ing intemational obligations on States and intwo years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dividuals, No prosecutions occurred at the iiistmcture of intemational law was under threat temational level during the Cold War. With this and appeared to be crumbling. It took avicious failure at the international level, the key juridiwar in Croatia in 1991 to stir public interest and .cal moments of intemational criminal law were the brutal war in Bosnia and Herzegovina to confined to the domestic circuit.' amplify the alarni bells for intemational action
The demands for legal process in the though itwould have been sounded agood deai 1990s witnessed the establishment of two ad eariier. The lack of a systematic enforcement hoc intemational criminal tribunals to try perregime in the five decades since World War II sons for the deaths of hundreds of thousands, contributed to the lack of respect for the legiti-The world community had determined that the macy of intemational criminal and humanitar-inner workings of political ceiisure and threats 'See generally Gerry Simpson,"Didactic and Dissident Stories in War Crimes Trials". 60 Alberta Law Review801 (discussing the trials ofElchmann, Demanjunk, Barbie, Polyukhovic. Preibke, Touvier and others. 1997 ).
of political,•economic, and military retaliation cannot mend a rift in the rule oflaw as large as the one created by the actions of ihtematibnal outlaws and that the failure of intemational criminal and humanitarian law was in large part due to the lack of an intemational penal regime. Deterrence would only be secured by the certainty of punishment through trial and impunity for human rights atrocities curbed by legal process. Thecreation ofthe Intemational criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia-a half century after the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were heid-revived hopes that in the postCold War era, crimes under intemational law can be deterred through international penal process. This Article examines the conflict in the former Yugoslavia which gave birth to the InternationarCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugo slavia (ICTFY). The iCTFY established the be ginning ofa new pattern in the genuine interna tional implernentation of intemational criminal and humanitarian law and the move back to the intemational model inaugurated at Nuremberg which had in theCold War era been boldly sup planted by national prosecutions. The Article seeks to show that even this ad hoc tribunal was the by-product of intemational realpolitlk. It was bomout ofa political desireto redeemthe inter national community's conscience rather than the primary commitment of the international community to guarantee intemational justice.
The ad hoc tribunal was established after ef forts to reach political settlement had proved futile and had in fact shielded the bellicose Serbs from firm and decisive intemational ac tion, allowing them to further their nationalist agenda at the expense of other entities of the Yugoslavian federation. The ICTFY was not established becauseofthe primary view bythe UN or the powerful States that control it over the intrinsic value on punishing war criminals or upholding the rule of law but rather the shame that resulted from a misguided con ception that the Balkan crisis would be effec tively resolved through a political settlement.
Re-awakening International Penal Process
The international Tribunal for the Pros ecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Intemational Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yu goslavia Since 1991, as it is officially called, was established by the United Nations Secu rity Council in . In an unprecedented decision by the Security Council, the tribunal was established as an enforcement measure pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.^Its creation was essentially prompted bytwo con siderations. First, by 1993, it had become ob vious that the parties to the Yugoslav conflict were unwilling, and in the case of Bosnia and Heizegovina, unableto bring tojusticepersons responsibleforthe egregious crimes that werê Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto. Revisiting the Balkan Crisis ... Not without controversy, the international community, with the Security Council atits helm, decided that the establishment of an Interna tional tribunal empowered to prosecute persons responsible for serious violatioris ofinternational humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 wasaworthy precedent to set, worthy even to the extent of subjugating the sovereignty ofthe States in volved. The ICTFY while welcomed, its Jegal basis was not, owing to a number offactors all of which in one way or another are linked to considerations of State sovereignty. But in the end, the horrors ofthe Balkan conflict and the international outrage they generated prevailed, with no State (except the Yugoslav Republics) being bold enough to object strenuously and thus appear to be actively blocking the quest for intemational justice and thus subordinating the noble idea to the vagaries ofrealpolitik. The obstacle isa clearSoviet messagethatMoscow will veto anyattempt touse UN forces tosettlean internal Yugoslav dispute...the Soviets will resistany move thatcould setaprecedentfor'internalising'nationalist conflicts such'asthosethatplague Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's govemmenL Ibid.
United Nations YearBook (1991) There were neverany easy options for the former Yugoslavia. The war posed a stronger challenge to norms and principles among con cerned governments than a classical strategic threat would havedone. Theuse ofannedforce, even collectively; to influence the course of the conflict wastherefore likely to generate contra dictory pressures and unsatisfactory results.
From the initial stages, it was evident that the major actors Or governments had varying incli nations or interests, and thiscreated tensions in theregional organisations as well as in theUN.T he result was disaster. Support for maintain ing the 'unity' and 'temtorial integrity' ofYugosla via worsened the situation, delaying interna tional pressure on the Serbs 'to undertake timely refonn toward a loose confederation while in tensifying internal pressures for a complete break-up.'^Â s theEC wastheonly organisation involved first-hand in thedeveloping crisis, it should have been the first to apprise the international com munity that the dissolution of Yugoslavia was October 1991 Report, above n 22.
•^Article 52(2) provides that Member States entering into regional arrangements 'shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.' UN Charter Article 52(2).
" In response to letters from the International community requesting that the United Nations reinforce EC efforts due tolhe rapidlydeteriorating situation In Yugoslavia, ameeting ofthe United Nations Security Council "Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Bombs and Blather: The Strategy Deficit; Can Clinton Find America's Missing Foreign Policy?" Washington Post 17 January 1993. atC1. The United States led the initial call for respecting Yugoslavia's tem'torial integrity, qualifying this appeal. 'We particularly call upon the centra! government and the Yugoslav army to end the bloodshed, to exercise restraint and to commence negotiations immediately.' State Dept., 28 June 1991 (regular briefing by Margaret Tutwiler), available in Lexis, Nexis Library, Currnt File. Additionally, support for maintaining the 'tem'torial integrity' ofthe Yugoslav federation was voiced by the EC and its members, and the Conference oh Security and Co-operation In Europe (CSCE). Weller, above n18 at570. Within days ofthe initial independencededarations, the Serb-dominatedYugoslavgovemmentoutlawed Slovenia's arid Croatia's independence declarations and ordered the federal army to seize control of the borders with Slovenia. World News Summary, Agence France Presse, 27 June 1991. The federal defence ministry stated the army would 'take all necessary steps' todefend Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. Ibid. 166f inevitable, and that appeais to preserve Yugoslavia's unity were in effect reinforcing the Sert)-dominated government and army's efforts to quash the republics' independence.^® The initiai policy of the EC ofkeeping Yugosiavia to gether was replaced by attempts to find com promise soiutions, which in effect meant redraw ing frorttiers. Such an approach proved difficuit on one main reason, the unwiiiingness of the parties to compromise on territory.®^Adding to this problem was the premature recognition by some European States ofthe independence of someofthe breakaway States. The Europeans kept the UN out ofYugosiavia in the eariy stages. The EC's year-long solo efforts proved inad equate to negotiate a political settlement of the conflict in Yugoslavia. While the commitment of the EC to handle the crisis was meritorious, it was notrealistic. The nature ofthe dispute sim ply did not lend itself to simple negotiation of a soiutiDn.®^The US, still involved in the Gulf, in sisted on the logic ofthe UN Charter and hence feltthatthe UN hadnorole toplay unless regional attempts failed.
Theinitial ambivalent Security Council reso lutions that sided with or punished the Serbs also served to undermine efforts that depended on all the parties' co-operation." in its first ac tion concerning the Yugoslav conflict, the Se curity Council displayed its incomplete under standing ofthe underpinnings ofthecrisis. At its first meeting to address the Yugoslav crisis, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 713, expressing 'deep concem' overthe fighting in Yugosiavia, theheavy loss oflife, and, in particu lar, the consequences for the border areas of neighbouring countries." As a remedy, the resolution called forthe immediate implementaWelier,'above n18 at570. This policy of proclaiming territorial integrity, precluding internal attempts at secession, 'was perceived by the Serbian-dominated central authority ascarte blanche for the forcible implemen tation ofits goals to reunify the federation and consolidate its leadership within it.' ibid, at572.
Eknesrabove n 19 at 115.
Deep-seeded animosity and distrust, coupled with the absence of a central authority in Yugoslavia, foretold that the parties were not likely to simply talk through their differences. Without apeacekeeping force to bring order and stability to the region, the charged situation did not permit anegotiated settlement of political differences. While some regional organisations are outfitted to compliment negotiation efforts with the dispatch of peacekeeping forces, the EC is not equipped to resort to peacekeeping, instead, the EC sent 'monitors' to the region that proved incapable of little more than observing the escalating violence. See Amy Lou King. "Bosnia- with the parties concerning the feasibility of de-When the UN authorised the deployment of a ploying aUN peacekeeping operation in Yugo-peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR), it made no slavla, and arranged yet another cease-fire attempts to consolidate its efforts with the mediaagreement.' ' " In Resolution 721. the Council tion efforts ofthe EC. This disjointed approach of endorsed Vance's efforts, although It would not handling the Yugoslav crisis, with the UN conconsider a peacekeeping operation until the centrating on peacekeeping, while the EC warring parties complied with previous agree-stmggled at' peacemaking, resulted in ahost of ments Vance's efforts were solely targeted at mutually incompatible and haphazardly conending the bloody Serb-Croat War, inspite of structed policies,' which doomed both operations signsthatthetheatreofwarwaslikelytoexpand to failure.' ' as other States clamoured for independence.
. About two months after the deployment of
In response to the so-called Vance Plan, in UNPROFORin Croatia, on3March 1992, Bosnia January 1992, the UN passed Resolution 749, declared itself an independent nation after arefwhich authorised the full deployment of aUnited erendum in which 63% voted for the emergence Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) which ofan independent Republic. Backed by Belgrade, was to be deployed in three UN Protected Areas. Bosnian-Serbs demanded that the Bosnian gov- Pale. Well-armed Serbian militia were able to oc-conflict to the European Community, urging the cupy, atsome points, 70% of Bosnian territory. The three communities in Bosnia to participate in the Serbian leaders carried out a policy of 'ethnic ongoing discussions.^Thus, the EC, acting uncleansing' to try to rid the occupied teiritories of der the auspices of the Conference onYugosiaBosnian-Muslims through a systematic policy of • via since September 1991, continued taiks with widespread massacres and other serious viola-the three factions to achieve a settlement and tions of human rights and humanitarian law, in-added the job of negotiating constitutional arcluding mass deportations ofcivilian Muslims.^rangements for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Because In,June 1992, as the conflict intensified and Vance's peacekeeping plan, proposed in. the extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Secu-midst ofthe Serb-Croat conflict, primarily dealt rity Council acted in anattempt todeal with esca-with the facilitation of UNPROFOR for Croatia, lating violence andthetask offacilitating human!-the Council made only sporadic mention of the tarian assistance to the besieged regions,^by Vance/UN peacekeeping plan in themonths folenlarging UNPROFOR's mandate and strength lowing its endorsement" The US and EC's recin order toensure the security and functioning of ognition of the republic's independence in the the airport at Sarajevo, and the delivery of hu-midst ofthe conflict furthered the deepening mismanitarian assistance to that city and its envi-trust and animosity already separating the ethnic rons. However the Council deferred the task of actions, throwing anotherwrench into an already negotiating an overall political settlement of the complicated scenario. **The term 'ethnic cleansing' has been used to designate the practice of'rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force orintimidation to remove persons orgiven groups from the area.' Interim Report ofthe Commission ofExperts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780(1992), UN SCOR, Annex 55, UN,Doc. 5/25274 (10 February 1993) .
See,e.g., report oftheSecretary-General pursuant toSecurity Counsil Resolution 760 UN S.COR, UN Doc. S/24080,'para. 18(describing the desperate situation emerging in Bosnia-Herzegovina as 'one ofthe worst humanitarian emergencies ofourtime').
Repeatedly, the Security Council deferred settlement of the dispute in Bosnia to the EC, noting the continuing role thattheEC played in achieving a peaceful solution in Yugoslavia through theConference on Yugoslavia, commending its efforts, and demanding that all parties concerned co-operate fully with the efforts of the EC 'to bring about urgently a negotiated political solution respecting the principle that any change ofborder by force isnot acceptable.' SC Res. 652, UN SCOR, 2918th mtg., 652 (1992 
International Response to the Yugo^av Crisis Through Legal Process
Over the next several months, the situa tion in Bosnia-Herzegovina deteriorated rap idly with the Security Council's already shaky peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts threat ened byreports of widespread violations of in ternational humanitarian law, the Serbs' con tinued mass forcible expulsion and deporta tion of Bosnian-Muslims in the region,®^the imprisonment and abuse of civilians in deten-"See Ibid at 1554. Although the three parties held divergent views on thefuture structure ofBosniaHerzegovina, the co-chairmen believed that, given the intermingled population ofBosnia, there 'appearfed] tobe no viable way tocreate three territorially distinct SlatOs based on ethnic orconfessional principles.' and thus, Uie establishment ofa decentralised state Is the only 'viable and stable solution that does not acquiesce in already accomplished ethnic cleansing.' Ibid, at1559. AStatement ofPrinciples emerged from theLondon Conference toserve asthe basis ofafuture negotiated settlement providing for the cessation offighting and the use offorce by all parties: the non-recognition of advantages obtained by the use offorce; respect for individual rights and fundamental freedoms asembodied in international humanitarian law; the condemnation offorcible expulsions and illegal detentions; respectfor independence, sovereignty, and tem'torial integrity; compliance with Security Council Resolutions; the provision ofhumanitarian assistance; and co-operation in monitoring, peacekeeping, and arms control operations. Additionally, the Conference generated a Statement on Bosnia, setting forth the provisions necessary for a political settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. London Conference Documents, above n 49at1533.1537.
• " Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated:
All international observers agree that what ishappening isa concerted effort by the Serbs ofBosniaHerzegovina, with the acquiescence of, and atleast some support from, JNA, to create 'ethnically pure' regions in the context ofnegotiations on the 'cantonlsation'ofthe Republic in the EC Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Ibid. para. 5.In addition tothemore than 900,000 persons displaced from Croatia, atthetime ofVance's arrival on 14 April 1992, an estimated 184,000 persons had been displaced from Bosnia-Herzegovina. ByApril 20 of that year, this number had grown to 230,000, and by Ivlay, over 520,000 persons had been displaced from Arguably the peace settlement negotiations by Vance and Owen were not helped by the for mation of the 'war crimes commission'. The political climate and the intensity of the conflict at that time created a situationin which the pur suit ofa political settlement was deemed a pri ority. The alleged 'criminals' were thevery same leaders ofthe Yugoslav factions that Vance and Owen were assigned to pressure and cajole into a political settlement over the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Certainly, the lastthing that Vance and Owen needed was a war cimes that would demonstrate the criminality of Serbian leaders, including Milosevic, and the victimisation ofthe Bosnians. If that happened, world public opinion would clamour for account ability for the atrocities. Milosevic and other Serbian leaders would not, underthese circum stances, agree to a negotiated settlement when they were the targets of the war crimes commission's investigation. Owen thought that equal moral blameworthiness was needed to achieve a climate that would convince the Bosnians toaccept whatever the Serbians dic tated, and toavoid focusing on theprospect of the prosecution of Serbian leaders. '"See SCRes. 808, UNSCOR, 3175th mtg., UN Doc/803 (1993) .
The pursuit of justice was a response to international humanitarian concems and to the terrible atrocities of the war that the media brought so vividly to the attention ofworld pub lic opinion. But, becausethe major powers did not wantto intervenemiiitariiy, the UN and EC mediators had neither a stick nor a carrot to induce cessation of hostilities. The establish mentofan international investigative body with the broadest possible mandate since Nuremberg wasjustthesortofstick that the UN and EC mediators needed to pressurise the Serbian leadership. However, political settlement negotiations could not be conducted while the prospects of criminal investigation and eventual prosecution existed, inthe face of thisdilemma, the choice made was to favour politics overjus tice. As a result,the Commissionnever received adequatefunding from the UN to conduct itsfield investigations. The limited resources provided by the UN only covered the bare minimum of ad ministration costsfor a short period oftime. More over, the UN frequently placed bureaucratic and financial hurdles in the Commission's way. Con sequently, the Commission resorted to extemal funding sources and accepted the aid of volun teers and personnel contributed by certain gov While press reports charging responsibility for 'ethnic cleansing,' 'systematic rape,' and other systematic violations ofInternational humanitarian law could beignored, evidence substantiating these allegations was a real threat The reasons for this action were not explained and theSecurity Council did not take a position onthe termination ofthe Commission ofexperts. Nevertheless, theSecretary-General, in a 1995 report totheCommis sion ofHuman Rights, incorrectly stated that theCommission ofExperts 'concluded its work by30April 1994 in accordance with thedecision under theterms ofthe SCresolution 827 (1993) .' SeeSituation onHuman Rights in Bosnia andHerzegovina: Report oftheSecretary-General, UN ESCOR, 51stSess., 15,UN Doc. E/CN.4/ 1995 /62 (9 February 1995 . The year-long delay in theappointment ofRichard Goldstone as Prosecutor is evidence ofthe politicisation oftheTribunal. The Secretary-General presented his first nomination for the Prosecutor totheSecurity Council in August 1993. In the same month, theUK requested theSecurity Council to On 3May 1993, the Secretary-General duly ecute theirnationals, exhume their mass grave submitted his report to the Security Council as sites, and. not unimportantly, deepen asense requested:®® The report expiains the iegal ba-of subjugation in States already angered by a sis for the tribunal's establishment, its compe-perceived prejudice against them. The Secutence and organisation, investigation and pre-rity Councii opted to invoke Chapter Vil. On 25 trial proceedings, trial and post-trial proceed-May 1993, the Security Council adopted Resoings (including those relating to the rights ofthe iution 827 and unanimously approved the reaccused, witness protection, judgment and port of the Secretary-General, deciding, Despite the tremendous efforts of Vance and Owen, the success of the political settle ment process over Bosnia-Herzegovina re mained to be. realised, in large part due to the fact thatthe UN's hesitant and often equivocal actions made an eventual peaceful settlement of the Bosnian conflict dubious. Tracing the UN's haphazard responseto the Yugoslav criTurkey, onbehalfofthemembers oftheOrganization ofthe Islamic Conference (QIC) and as members ofthe 010 Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina (UN Doc. A/47/920-S25512 (1993) ); Mexico (UN Doc. S/25417 (1993) ): Netherlands (UN Doc. S/25716 (1993) ); Russian Federation (UN Doc. S/25537 (1993) ); Slovenia (UN Doc. S/25652 (1993) ); andtheUnited States (UN Doc. S/25575 (1993) 31 ILM 1584 31 ILM (1992 ). It should be noted that the argument may be made that the inclusion of Russia in the Contact Group, facilitated largely by the United States, was amechanism to avoid movementon 'hard' issues. On one view the inclusion of Russia appears to create avaried intemationai presence and consensus on Bosnia, it also creates the indefinite inclusion ofinternal competing agendas in the management ofthe conflict.
"See UN Security Council Resolution 1021 of 22 November 1995 , 35 ILM 257 (1996 ; UN Security Council Resolution 1022 ofNovember 22,1995 22, ,35 ILM 259(1996 ; UN Security Council Resolution 1026 of 30 November 1995 ,35 ILM 251 (1996 n addition to the legal arguments itframed in its letterto the Secretary-Genera! of19 May 1993, iri which the Permanent Mission ofYugoslavia challenged the authority ofthe Security Council to establish aWbunal, officials of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia declared that they did not recognise the competence of the Tribunal.' Yugoslav letter, above n71. See also Bassiouni &Manikas, above n65 at 238.
•85E Sciolino, 'Accord Reached to End the War in Bosnia; Clinton Pledges US Troops to Keep Peace," NewYork Times, 22 November 1995," at A1. The Dayton Accords were initialled on 21 November 1995, by the presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia in Dayton Ohio, ending the four-year war in the former ®®' DIssemblingin Serbia.Asian WallStreetJournal. 10February1997at12, availablein Westlaw, Intlnews.
"PhysiciansforHuman Rights, Medicine UnderSiegein Yugoslavia: f99f-f995(1996)32._ Inter-Entity Boundary, Annex 2to the General Framework Agreement For Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 December 1995 ,35ILM 111(1996 . Charged with the maintenance of intemationai peace and security, the United Nations fell short of fulfilling this mandatewhen it virtu ally ignored the Yugoslav crisis until Ithad spi- With the election ofTony Blair as British Prime Minister, the United Kingdom began to press NATO for a more forceful policy on arresting indicted war criminals. Surprisingly, it was the United Nations peacekeeping force in Croatia, and not the NATO force, which made the first arrest. In June 1997, an agent ofthe Tribunal's Office ofthe Prosecutor lured indicted warcriminal Slavko Dokmanovic outofSerbiaandinto Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), where hewas apprehended by UN peacekeeping forces, and delivered to the Yugoslavia Tribunal. railed out of control. Once involved, the Council relied on the parties to the Yugoslav crisis to abide by Its demands to cease fighting, with draw, and adhere to the on-agaln, off-agaln cease-fires, ignoring the underlying realities of the crisis. Ethnic factions living side by side in Yugoslavia could not answer to the rule of law, when their sacred homeland was threatened, their brothers shot, and their sisters and moth trying those who are responsible for shocking crimes.^^The creation of this ad hoc interna tional tribunal is one of the most recent achieve mentof the human rights movement.®® but this court was stitched together with many otherIn stitutions and mechanisms to form a human rights quilt with no perceivable design.®® It seemsthattheindividual patches were designed without a'full understanding ofthe existence of otherpatches, letalone full consideration ofhow they, complement each other. Thus one of the major flaws is that the ICTFY has not spec tacularly translated itsinstitutional achievement Into a positive social change creating a greater respect for human rights. 
